



## THE CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (CALL)

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# *News from the Front!*

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## **CONVOY PROTECTION**

**by CPT Phillip Parker, Combat Maneuver Analyst**

**MOGADISHU** --- Convoy operations serve as the lifeline carrying relief supplies and food to where they are needed in Somalia. The fulfillment of humanitarian assistance requirements depends upon the continued security of convoy operations.

Main Supply Route (MSR) security within Mogadishu and other population centers is an especially challenging mission. Techniques and procedures implemented by the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to successfully provide convoy security work well. These techniques are applicable to other potential Operations Other than War (OOTW) theaters, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Doctrinally, this Military Police (MP) mission encompasses three tasks: route reconnaissance, MSR security, and convoy security. Since there are not enough MPs in theater to execute all tasks, other forces supplement the security and protection mission.

Convoys are more vulnerable to attack than ground maneuver forces, and all convoy operations must be planned, prepared and executed as a combat operation.

Mounted patrols along MSRs are particularly vulnerable to ambush and interdiction. While the risk cannot be eliminated, the below-listed QRF-developed countermeasures prove successful:

- ◆ Use the aviation Scout Weapons Teams (SWTs) to conduct route reconnaissance and security operations.
- ◆ Limit unnecessary vehicle movement.
- ◆ Vary times of travel (streets in Mogadishu are quiet after 2400, so any movement is suspect).
- ◆ Vary routes.
- ◆ Use aircraft to move personnel and equipment.
- ◆ Move during hours of darkness whenever possible, still varying times of travel.
- ◆ Focus the MP main effort on securing lines of communication through a Provost Marshall Cell.
- ◆ Conduct a thorough METT-T analysis to determine the best location for TCPs and TCP manning task organization.
- ◆ Use coalition forces operating along the MSR to help man TCPs.
- ◆ Conduct convoy briefings (5-para OPORD) and conduct battle-drill rehearsals.
- ◆ Develop counterattack plans for enemy forces encountered along the MSRs.
- ◆ Develop an SOP or a battle drill for actions on contact so all personnel and elements understand what to do when attacked or ambushed.
- ◆ Rehearse possible combat operations from SP to RP.
- ◆ Test convoy communications before departure; use PRC-126s or Motorolas for internal convoy communication.
- ◆ Ensure the MP platoon, and other select elements conducting route security, know how to call for direct fire from supporting aviation assets.
- ◆ Employ three teams for convoy security: 1) scout team 2) lead element 3) trail element
- ◆ Include translators at heavily populated TCPs.
- ◆ Use mounted reconnaissance and surveillance patrols randomly and often to increase MSR presence and visibility.
- ◆ Employ CA/PSYOP teams to gain local support for increased restrictions.

These protection and security measures, successfully employed by the Quick Reaction Force in the Mogadishu area, provide a solid list of techniques and procedures applicable and adaptable to any potential OOTW area of operations.

# **MY OBSERVATIONS**

by **COL Roger Spickelmeir, Dir, CALL**

This month's *News From the Front* features several articles based on lessons coming from Somalia. With the bulk of U.S. forces scheduled to pull out of that theater next month, Somalia will cease to be a major source of observations and lessons. However, this month's Somalia-based articles provide valuable lessons applicable in any potential Operations Other than War (OOTW) theater.

The Command Judge Advocate, CPT Pede, who developed the Rules of Engagement (ROE) vignettes referenced in the article, provides a valuable training tool for units gearing up for a potential deployment. These vignettes greatly assisted the translation of written ROE into action, as soldiers routinely responded correctly in a variety of situations. There are few quicker ways for a small unit action to turn into an international incident than the misapplication of force that violates the stated ROE. The assistance rendered to commanders at all levels by the SJA in drafting the initial ROE and then interpreting subsequent directed changes cannot be overestimated.

As the Army faces new challenges around the globe, CALL will continue to rapidly turn relevant lessons to the field. As always, we continue to glean valuable lessons from the Combat Training Center front, where, every day, our Army hones its fighting skills to remain trained and ready!

**COL Roger Spickelmeir,**  
Dir, CALL

# **JAG INTEGRATION INTO OOTW TOC OPERATIONS**

**by CPT Parker, Combat Mnvr Analyst**

**MOGADISHU** --- The Command Judge Advocate (CJA) plays a critical role in TOC operations during Operations Other than War (OOTW). In Somalia, the CJA helped draft the initial ROE. Additionally, the CJA created a series of ROE vignettes portraying anticipated situations and providing examples of the "proper" response. These situations covered both ground force operations and aviation. (See accompanying ROE: Aviation article.)

ROE changes over time, based upon new conditions or in reaction to incidents within a given theater. The CJA provided sound advice about the implications of ROE changes from higher headquarters. Often UNOSOM would issue verbal changes about the freedom to engage a particular type of target, or the level of permission necessary before engagement. The CJA would proactively clarify the "new" definition of hostile intent, for example, and then spell out what ROE changes needed to be written and disseminated to everyone.

The CJA's vignettes clarified ROE down to the lowest level, ensuring soldiers could protect themselves from hostile threats without the hesitation that could cost their lives. The vignettes served as a force protection measure by helping soldiers understand the proper response to any given situation. This resulted in ROE being viewed as a guide to the freedom to engage, rather than an arbitrary restriction on their ability to protect themselves.

# **ROE: AVIATION**

by Clay Cooper, Military Analyst

**MOGADISHU** --- Understanding Rules of Engagement (ROE), resulting in the appropriate application of force, when necessary, is a critical task facing military personnel in Somalia.

An ROE violation at the squad level during Operations Other than War (OOTW) can instantly turn a small unit tactical event into a strategic-level international incident with national policy implications.

Lessons about ROE derived from U.S. Army operations in Somalia, as part of the United Nations UNOSOM Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping mission, can be categorized into principles applicable to ROE in other potential OOTW areas of operation.

The principles briefly outlined below can provide a basis for predeployment planning and preparation for commanders at all levels.

## **ROE PRINCIPLES:**

- **PURPOSE:** Prevent the indiscriminate use of deadly force, while allowing soldiers sufficient latitude to defend themselves. The premise of self-defense must be sustained. Soldiers must believe they can survive within the rules. ROE, then, impact soldier morale and attitude, while concurrently spelling out tactical and operational limits.

- **DEVELOPMENT:** ROE must be carefully tailored to comply with strategic and operational considerations while meeting the tactical requirements of various OOTW missions.

- **MEASURED RESPONSE:** This principle serves as the developmental baseplate. Defining ROE in terms of graduated response levels enables tactical elements to apply the force necessary to meet the varying levels of violence which characterize OOTW environments - all while minimizing collateral damage.

- **DISSEMINATION:** ROE must be published in writing, disseminated throughout the command, and thoroughly understood by all leaders and soldiers.

**- DISSEMINATION OF CHANGES:** Situational changes or immediate lessons may dictate changes to the initial ROE. Apply appropriate command emphasis to ensure changes, which must be made in writing, are quickly disseminated throughout the command.

**- FOCUSED TRAINING:** In an environment where random shooting and sniping is likely, only trained, disciplined soldiers are likely to exhibit the degree of restraint needed in OOTW. Situational training exercises (STXs), specifically focused on ROE in a variety of conditions, will develop the soldier skills necessary to properly respond. The decisions to most appropriately apply deadly or nondeadly force must be right. Rigorous training requiring immediate responses to a variety of situations, and followed by sound after-action reviews (AARs), will result in a higher likelihood of an appropriate response during an actual situation.

**- FRONTLINE LEADERSHIP:** The appropriate response for any given set of circumstances is a direct result of noncommissioned officer (NCO) leadership, maturity and experience. Experience in Somalia confirms a perennial lesson that good NCOs come from good soldiers, and good soldiers come from good recruiting.

**- STANDARDIZATION WITHIN COALITION:** Senior coalition commanders must standardize the interpretation and application of a common ROE by all coalition forces. Command emphasis, levels of training, skill in interaction with locals, and differing interpretations of written ROE are all factors impacting on the ability to standardize ROE within a coalition.

The development of some generic ROE scenarios by U.S. forces in Somalia provides excellent examples for use in the training of soldiers and units potentially missioned for OOTW. The scenarios encompass both ground elements and aviation elements. Following are two examples of aviation ROE scenarios used in training in Somalia.

***SITUATION NO. 1:*** While flying a daytime mission over a sparsely populated area, your aircraft receives small arms fire. You see the person who is shooting at you standing in a roadway below. You can easily break contact and move out of danger. Can you engage?

***SOLUTION:*** Yes. You may return fire and report the incident. The person firing at your aircraft is engaged in a hostile act. However, assess the potential for collateral damage to private property, livestock, or risk of harm to innocent bystanders in the area. The option of simply breaking contact and leaving the area may be the best choice, especially if you have a more urgent mission. Be sure to report the incident by radio and in your post-mission debriefing.

***SITUATION NO. 2:*** While flying a night patrol, you spot a pickup truck in the city with three men in it (two in the front and one in the back), all dressed in white robes. The truck is not near any coalition base, nor is it moving toward one. It is driving with its lights off. Each occupant is armed with an AK47. Can you engage?

***SOLUTION:*** No, unless provoked by hostile act or they exhibit hostile intent toward coalition forces. Report the situation by radio and in your post-mission debriefing. (It may be possible for ground forces to go out and stop and question the individuals and search the vehicle.) This may be a nongovernmental organization (NGO) guard vehicle or the local criminal police, both of which are authorized to carry weapons.

The situations and solutions above are just two examples of those actually used by the Quick Reaction Force in Somalia. The complete set of situations and solutions is included in **CALL's OPERATION RESTORE HOPE Lessons Learned Report.**

# **FAMILY SUPPORT**

by Sandra J. Lewis, Dir, Spouse Train & Ed Prog, CGSC, and CPT Thomas R. Jucks

**FORT LEAVENWORTH ---** A force projection Army, missioned to respond to contingencies anywhere in a volatile world, requires a sound Family Support Program at home station. Deployed troops, knowing their loved ones can rely on a strong family support program, can then focus all their energy and ability on their mission. Minimizing worries about their families minimizes mission distractors and increases the likelihood of mission success.

Some family support lessons, first validated during the massive Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM deployment, have been reaffirmed during the current deployment of forces to Somalia.

**\* REAR DETACHMENT COMMANDERS:** This job must be manned by a strong, knowledgeable and patient officer. Taking this type of officer "out of hide" during a deployment is a difficult decision, but experience clearly demonstrates that quality officers serving as Rear Detachment Commanders are literally a combat multiplier. Conversely, relatively weak or inexperienced officers cannot handle the myriad of problems arising during a deployment. This inability to routinely defuse issues can lead to major distractions for the troops in theater.

**\* FORMATION OF FAMILY SUPPORT GROUPS (FSGs):** The most successful FSG programs are in place and functioning PRIOR to the unit's deployment. By establishing what many term a "chain of concern" during garrison/nondeployment periods, the transition during an actual deployment is minimized. The peacetime FSG must routinely be exercised to be successful during a contingency or wartime deployment. During a unit rotation to a Combat Training Center, the FSG can "train" and exercise its functions. Although the unit commander's wife serves as the FSG leader in most instances, many very successful FSGs "elect" a leader, with the commander's wife serving in an advisory capacity. The commander's wife can tailor her activity to the level necessary without exerting unnecessary control of the group.

**\* PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING:** The Rear Detachment and the FSG must function as a team. Both should have an accurate roster of family members and dependents. Family assistance handbooks should be routinely issued to newly assigned personnel. Commanders should "test" their command information dissemination systems during peacetime to ensure the word gets passed to family members. Too often information is passed to a service member with the assumption he/she will take it home and pass it on. The hard lesson is that units better have a redundant means of communicating such information. By keeping family members involved and informed all the time, the requirements unique to stressful deployments will be handled more smoothly by everyone involved.



## **FAMILY SUPPORT PROGRAMS:**

### ***Initiatives and Focus***

- Deployed forces should use E-Mail to keep rear detachments informed.
- Establish unit-level family assistance centers, then let people know where they are.
- Sustain an accurate information flow between deployed units and their families.
- Conduct stress management classes. Provide access to parenting courses.
- Provide access to counseling: family; financial; stress; substance abuse, etc.
- Provide access to legal assistance.

## **FAMILY SUPPORT ASSISTANCE:**

### ***Typical Team Members:***

AER

SJA

CHAMPUS/MEDDAC

American Red Cross

ACS

# **TRADOC REMEDIAL ACTION PROGRAM (T-RAP) INFORMATION**

**by Rick Bogdan, Manuever Analyst**

As resources rapidly shrink at all levels, the necessity to set priorities about which issues to tackle first and the wisdom of systematically pursuing solutions to those issues become more evident daily.

The success of the lessons learned program is inevitably tied to success in solving issues. Further, the issues with the greatest impact on warfighting capabilities must be the issues solved first.

**TRADOC** Regulation 500-xx (Draft), *The TRADOC Remedial Action Program (T-RAP)*, establishes the procedures necessary to categorize issues in priority of importance, and the requirements to field solutions to those issues.

**H**ighlights from the regulation (now out for staffing) are:

- TRADOC lines up with the Army Remedial Action Program (A-RAP) and the joint equivalent.
- Issues enter the system from both the bottom up, i.e., from TRADOC schools/centers and from the top down, i.e., received from ARAP.
- TRADOC schools/centers work together to prioritize issues for Commander, TRADOC, for presentation to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
- The requirement is established to develop "Action Plans" for each issue in the system, to guarantee a systematic, comprehensive program of solution development and implementation.
- Prevents redundancy and promotes crosstalk.

## **Select Procedural Details:**

- The system revolves around the TRADOC Senior Review Council of Colonels comprised of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, Doctrine and Combat Development.
- The council meets semiannually to categorize issues and to assign issue solution proponents.
- TRADOC school/center issue proponent representatives meet annually, representing their commandants, to provide updates on issue resolution status and to prioritize issues for the TRADOC Commander's eventual presentation to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
- Lead issue resolution proponent will create an issue Action Plan to track the solution development and implementation process.

Since CALL drafted the regulation for TRADOC, CALL will assist proponent schools/centers in the identification of issues and solutions. Additionally, CALL can provide examples of prior Action Plans. These examples will assist action officers with the format and structure for action plans, which will free the action officers to concentrate on content.

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**DISCLAIMER**

This CALL publication is not a doctrinal product and is not intended to serve as a program to guide the conduct of operations and training. The information and lessons herein have not been staffed, but are the perceptions of those individuals involved in military exercises, activities and real-world events. The intent is to share knowledge, support discussion and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner.

*A Reminder!*

If you have articles and lessons of interest to the Total Force, please contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/9567 or DSN 552-3035/9567; FAX DSN 552-9564.

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